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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-1334 
___________ 
 
JOHN E. REARDON; JUDITH A. REARDON; JOHN J. REARDON 
 
v. 
 
NOEL HILLMAN; JAY SANCHEZ; DESIREE RAMSEY; RYAN MERRIGAN 
 
John E. Reardon, 
                  Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-18-cv-01296) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Brian R. Martinotti 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Appellees’ Motion for Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 18, 2019 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE, and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed July 19, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se appellant John Reardon appeals the District Court’s order denying several 
post-judgment motions.  The Government has filed a motion for summary affirmance.  
We will grant the Government’s motion and summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In his complaint, Reardon alleged that District Judge Noel Hillman and three 
employees of the District of New Jersey’s Clerk’s Office violated his constitutional rights 
by refusing to enter default and a default judgment in his favor in two other actions that 
he litigated in the District of New Jersey.  The District Court dismissed the complaint 
with prejudice as to Judge Hillman and without prejudice as to the other defendants.  
Reardon elected to stand on his complaint and appealed to this Court.  We affirmed, 
concluding that “[t]he District Court correctly concluded that absolute judicial immunity 
applies in this case insofar as Reardon claims his injuries stem directly from the failure of 
District Judge Hillman and the Clerk’s Office employees to direct the entry of default 
judgment in his favor.”  See Reardon v. Hillman, 735 F. App’x 45, 46 (3d Cir. 2018) (per 
curiam) (non-precedential). 
 Reardon then filed a Rule 60(b) motion in the District Court.  He alleged that the 
Courts had erred in concluding that the defendants were immune from suit and that the 
District Court had erroneously dismissed his complaint sua sponte.  He also filed a 
motion to amend his complaint and a motion to recuse the District Judge.  The District 
Court denied the motions, and Reardon filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the denial of relief under Rule 60(b)(4), and we review orders concerning other 
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subsections of Rule 60(b) for abuse of discretion.  See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 
F.3d 244, 251 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2008).  We review the District Court’s denial of Reardon’s 
motions for leave to amend and for recusal for abuse of discretion.  See City of 
Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset Mgmt. Corp., 908 F.3d 872, 878 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(amendment); Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 166 (3d Cir. 
2004) (recusal). 
 The District Court did not err in denying Reardon’s motions.  He raised on direct 
appeal all of the arguments that he presented in his Rule 60(b) motion, and in affirming, 
we necessarily rejected those arguments.  “A request for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) 
cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal,” Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 343 (3d Cir. 
1999) (alteration omitted) (quoting Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 
F.3d 644, 653 (3d Cir. 1998)), let alone as a substitute for rehearing or certiorari, see 
Reform Party of Allegheny Cty. v. Allegheny Cty. Dep’t of Elections, 174 F.3d 305, 312 
(3d Cir. 1999) (en banc); see also United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 
260, 270 (2010) (“[A] motion under Rule 60(b)(4) is not a substitute for a timely 
appeal.”).  Thus, the District Court properly denied Reardon’s Rule 60(b) motion.  See 
generally Bell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 214 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The ground 
for setting aside a judgment under Rule 60(b) must be something that could not have 
been used to obtain a reversal by means of a direct appeal.”). 
 Nor did the District Court err in denying Reardon’s request to amend his 
complaint.  The District Court provided Reardon with an opportunity to amend his 
complaint when it initially dismissed it, but Reardon instead chose to appeal immediately.  
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While Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) gives district courts broad discretion to permit amendment, 
“the liberality of the rule is no longer applicable once judgment has been entered,” and 
instead, amendment “cannot be allowed until the judgment is set aside or vacated under 
Rule 59 or Rule 60.”  Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 207–08 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(quotation marks omitted).  As just noted, Reardon provided no valid basis to reopen the 
judgment under Rule 60(b).  Moreover, insofar as Reardon merely reasserted essentially 
the same claims that this Court had already concluded were barred by the defendants’ 
immunity, any amendment would have been futile.  See generally id. at 209. 
 Finally, the District Court committed no error in denying Reardon’s motion to 
recuse.  Reardon’s motion was premised on his belief that the District Court acted 
improperly in dismissing his complaint, but “[w]e have repeatedly stated that a party’s 
displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal.”  Securacomm 
Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion for summary disposition and will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
